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Abstract In contrast with England and Wales, where there is a discretion to
exclude improperly obtained evidence, exclusion in Greece is automatic. Article
177 para. 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure mandates that evidence obtained by
the commission of criminal offences is not taken into consideration. In
addition, article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution prohibits the use of evidence
obtained in violation of the right to privacy. Inspired by the rigidity of these
exclusionary rules, the rights-centred approach that they reflect and the
context of a constitutional criminal procedure within which they apply, this
article sheds light on the protection of constitutional rights as a rationale for
the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. It does so against the
background of the reliability-centred exclusionary doctrine in England.
he study of other legal systems makes us understand our own system
better; what it is, what it must be, what it can become.’1 With these
questions in mind, this article attests to the need to study other legal
‘T
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Amérique et en France—Culture juridique française et common law (Odile Jacob: Paris, 2003) 8 (in French).
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systems’ solutions to one of the most tormenting problems in the law;2 that of the
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. While there is some interest in
England and Wales in developments in the Commonwealth and more generally
the common law world,3 reference to other legal traditions’ responses has been
rare.4 This article’s main ambition is to demonstrate that important lessons might
be learnt by stepping beyond the boundaries of the common law tradition in this
domain.5 More specifically, this article focuses on the exclusionary rules
developed in Greece, which are automatic and absolute, and have largely grown
under the influence of constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence. As an obvious
counterpoint to the discretionary approach to excluding improperly obtained
evidence favoured in England and Wales, comparative consideration of Hellenic
law and jurisprudence might usefully inform English debates on improperly
obtained evidence. The following discussion will be limited to the exclusion of
inherently reliable non-confession evidence,6 in particular evidence obtained in
violation of the right to privacy. This is where the English debate on improperly
obtained evidence is at its most controversial, and the comparative study of
Hellenic law may be most illuminating.
1. The road to automatic exclusionary rules in Greece
Given that the first Arios Pagos (Cassation Court of Greece) decision prohibiting
the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence dates back to 1871,7 a brief
historical review is in order. Hellenic law on improperly obtained evidence has
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2 R. Traynor, ‘Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States’ (1962) 3 Duke Law Journal 319.
3 See, e.g., A. Choo and S. Nash, ‘Improperly Obtained Evidence in the Commonwealth: Lessons for
England and Wales?’ (2007) 11 E & P 75; B. Emmerson and A. Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal
Justice (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2001) 422–6; P. Mirfield, Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained
Evidence (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997) 319–70.
4 See A. Choo, ‘Improperly Obtained Evidence: A Reconsideration’ (1989) 9 Legal Studies 26; J. Spencer,
‘Evidence’ in M. Delmas-Marty and J. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures, Cambridge Studies
in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005) 594 at
603–10. To my knowledge, few are the examples of studies of Continental exclusionary rules even
if one looks at other common law countries. See, however, C. Bradley, ‘Mapp Goes Abroad’ (2001) 52
Case Western Reserve Law Review 375; C. Bradley, ‘The Emerging International Consensus as to
Criminal Procedure Rules’ (1993) 14 Michigan Journal of International Law 171; C. Bradley, ‘The
Exclusionary Rule in Germany’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1032; W. Pakter, ‘Exclusionary Rules in
France, Germany and Italy’ (1985) 9 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 1.
5 For a stimulating discussion on legal traditions see generally H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the
World, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004).
6 In relation to improperly obtained confessional evidence there is again a contrast between
automatic exclusion in Greece and discretionary exclusion in England and Wales, s. 76(2) of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 notwithstanding.
7 Arios Pagos 89/ 1871, 6 Ellinikoi Kodikes 165.
developed in connection with individual rights protected by the Constitution.8
In particular, the origins of contemporary Hellenic exclusionary rules can be
traced back to 19th century Arios Pagos case law developed in the context of the
right to secrecy of correspondence.9 During that era, Arios Pagos read into the
right to secrecy of correspondence a prohibition on using evidence obtained in
violation of this right.10 As succinctly put by the General Prosecutor of Arios
Pagos, the right to secrecy of correspondence forbade ‘the seizure or unsealing of
letters as well as the use of their content with the aim of discovering and proving
the commission of crimes’.11 In reality, however, there was hardly ever exclusion
at this time. The seizure of unsealed letters was held not to amount to a breach of
the right to secrecy of correspondence.12 Moreover, the right ceased to produce
its protective effect after the delivery of a letter to its addressee, especially if the
addressee became aware of its content.13 In other words, Arios Pagos construed
this constitutional right so narrowly that the seizure of letters hardly ever fell
within its scope. Arios Pagos’s pro-exclusion rhetoric was thus deprived of any
practical effect.
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8 See Part B of the Constitution of 1975 (‘Bill of Rights’).
9 The right to secrecy of correspondence is a specific expression of the broader right to privacy. It is
protected by article 19 of the Constitution which states that ‘the secrecy of letters and all other
forms of free correspondence or communication shall be absolutely inviolable’. See D.
Giannoulopoulos, ‘Protecting the Right to Secrecy of Correspondence: Constitutional Myths and
Reality in Modern Greece’ (2005) 9(2) Mediterranean Journal of Human Rights 119; G. Kaminis, ‘Secrecy
of Telephone Communication: Constitutional Protection and its Application from the Criminal
Law Legislator and the Courts’ (1995) 43 Nomiko Bima 505 (in Greek); P. Paulopoulos, ‘Technological
Evolution and Constitutional Rights: The Modern Adventures of Secrecy of Correspondence’ (1987)
35 Nomiko Bima 1511 (in Greek); S. Tsakirakis, ‘Secrecy of Correspondence: Absolutely Inviolable or
a Wish of the Legal Order?’ (1993) 41 Nomiko Bima 995 (in Greek); P. Tsiris, The Constitutional Protection
of the Right to Secrecy of Correspondence (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Komitini, 2002) 72–3 (in
Greek).
10 See G. Kaminis, Illegally Obtained Evidence and Constitutional Guarantees of Human Rights (The Exclusion
of Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings) (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Komotini, 1998) 23
at 25 (in Greek).
11 K. Kollias, Legal Opinion No. 31/ 1952, 3 Poinika Chronika 457.
12 See Court of Appeal of Athens 235/ 1920, ΛΑ′ Themis 484: ‘it is not permitted to seize or adduce
evidence of letters in court […] and it is not possible to make any use of their content […]. However,
this strict version of the inviolability [of the right to secrecy of correspondence] doctrine does not
apply in relation to letters in possession of the addressees who can adduce them as evidence […]’.
See also Arios Pagos 70/ 1891, Β′ Themis 345; Arios Pagos 169/ 1893, Δ′ Themis 388; Arios Pagos 76/
1894, Ε′ Themis 278; Arios Pagos 23/ 1909, Κ′ Themis 130; Arios Pagos 96/ 1919, Λ′ Themis 298; The
Court of First Instance of Athens 357/ 1923, ΚΓ′ Themis 14; Arios Pagos 347/ 1924, ΛΕ′ Themis 535;
Arios Pagos 189/ 1933, ΜΔ′ Themis 724; Arios Pagos 102/ 1935, ΜΣΤ′ Themis 857; Arios Pagos 581/
1939, ΝΑ′ Themis 181; Arios Pagos 861/ 1947, ΝΗ′ Themis 581.
13 N. Saripolos, System of Constitutional Law (Classic Legal Library: Athens-Komotini, 1987) 94; originally
published in 1923 (in Greek).
The rise of telephone communication and greater availability of technology facili-
tating the covert recording of private conversations, telephone or other, in the
1950s led to an explosion in the use of covertly obtained recordings in civil and
criminal trials.14 It is at this time that Arios Pagos abandoned the rhetoric of
evidential prohibitions inherent in constitutional rights, turning conformity
with criminal law, rather than with the Constitution, into the main criterion for
admissibility.15
More specifically, telephone taps and recordings of face-to-face private conversa-
tions were admissible in court under the condition that they had not been
obtained by the commission of a criminal offence. Article 370A of the Penal Code
(PC) proscribed the covert recording of conversations between third parties, but,
crucially, this provision did not extend to recordings made by one of the parties to
the conversation.16 As a result, when it was one of the parties that covertly
recorded the conversation without the consent of the other(s), the recording was
admissible, since no criminal offence had been committed.17 Such recordings
were not barred by the Constitution either, after Arios Pagos held, in an important
decision in 1969, that the right to secrecy of correspondence did not have
horizontal effect; it limited the state only and did not apply to interference by
private individuals.18
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14 See A. Psarouda-Benaki, ‘The Tape Recorder in the Criminal Trial and the Need to Protect Oral
Speech’ (1965) 15 Poinika Chronika 397 (in Greek).
15 A. Charalabakis, ‘The Punishable Nature of Interceptions and the Procedural Use of their Product’
(2002) 50 Nomiko Bima 1061 at 1065 (in Greek).
16 Arios Pagos 717/ 1984, 34 Poinika Chronika 1030 at 1031; discussed by Kaminis, above n. 10 at 28.
17 See Kaminis, above n. 10 at 29–30.
18 See Arios Pagos 60/ 1969, 17 Nomiko Bima 562. See also General Prosecutor of Arios Pagos,
Legal Opinion No. 8/ 1972, 20 Nomiko Bima 1120; Arios Pagos 1002/ 1977, 27 Poinika Chronika
456. Many commentators argued, contra, that the act of covertly recording private conver-
sations was always a violation of the Constitution, independently of whether it was the state
or private individuals who were responsible for it. They were deducing from this that covertly
obtained recordings should not be used in court. See K. Stamatis, Opinion of the Prosecutor
of the Court of Arios Pagos in Arios Pagos 717/ 1984, 34 Poinika Chronika 1030 at 1033. See also
Court of Appeal of Thessaloniki 189/ 1981, 32 Poinika Chronika 552 at 553, where the Court
of Appeal held that ‘a voice recording without the knowledge of the person whose words
are recorded—irrespective of who undertakes it (a private individual or a public service, i.e.
the military, the police etc.) and irrespective of its objective—constitutes an illegal means of
evidence’.
Substantive law thus contributed to a regime of wide admissibility of tape-
recorded conversations in criminal19 and civil20 trials, which remained intact until
the beginning of the 1990s.
The theory of balancing
The majority of criminal law scholars in Greece have traditionally endorsed the
‘theory of balancing’ (Abwägungslehre), following German scholarship on this
point. According to this theory, the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence
must be determined upon a balancing of competing interests on a case-by-case
basis.21 Courts should exclude improperly obtained evidence only when the
interest in not condoning rights-violations, by admitting evidence obtained in
violation of individual rights, weighs more heavily than the interest in efficiently
combating crime.22 This balancing exercise gives courts some flexibility, allowing
them to avoid ‘predetermined legal formulae’23 incapable of tracking the
infinitely variable circumstances of relevant cases.
Since the balancing theory is apparently inconsistent with the idea that exclusion
is inherent in constitutional rights, it is revealing to observe attempts to bring it
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19 See Arios Pagos 85/ 1962, 12 Poinika Chronika 338; Arios Pagos 139/ 1963, 13 Poinika Chronika 345;
Arios Pagos 571/ 1970, 21 Poinika Chronika 159; Arios Pagos 240/ 1974, 24 Poinika Chronika 53;
Arios Pagos 717/ 1984, 34 Poinika Chronika 1030; Arios Pagos 1283/ 1985, 36 Poinika Chronika 283;
Arios Pagos 26/ 1986, 34 Nomiko Bima 586; Judicial chamber of the Court of Appeal of Athens 187/
1985, 33 Nomiko Bima 1467; Judicial chamber of the Court of First Instance of Kilkis 50/ 1986, 11
Armenopoulos 1002; Arios Pagos 1150/ 1989, 37 Nomiko Bima 1264.
20 Covertly obtained recordings were being regularly admitted mainly in divorce proceedings until
the beginning of the 1990s. See Arios Pagos 673/ 1983, 14 Diki 445; Arios Pagos 381/ 1987, 36
Nomiko Bima 563. See also Charalabakis, above n. 15 at 1065; Tz. Iliopoulou-Stragga, ‘The Use of
Illegally Obtained Evidence to Prove the Defendant’s Innocence after the Revision (2001) of the
Constitution’ (2002) 2 Poinikos Logos 2175 at 2180-1 (in Greek).
21 See N. Androulakis, Fundamental Notions of the Criminal Process, 2nd edn (Ant. N. Sakkoulas
Publishers: Athens-Komotini, 1994) 181 (in Greek); Th. Dalakouras, ‘Prohibited Evidence: Doctrinal
Foundations of Evidential Prohibitions in the Criminal Process’ in Hellenic Association of Penal
Law (ΕΕΠΔ), Evidence in the Criminal Process, Proceedings of the 6th panhellenic conference
(P. N. Sakkoulas: Athens, 1998) 60 (in Greek); N. Dimitratos, Evidential Prohibitions in the Criminal
Process, Poinika No. 35 (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Komotini, 1992) 39 (in Greek);
A. Kostaras, ‘Do the Ends Justify the Means? Or the Procedural Evaluation of Illegally Obtained or
Illegally Used Criminal Evidence’ (1984) Efimerida Ellinon Nomikon 169 at 178 (in Greek); S.
Papageorgiou-Gonatas, ‘The Problem of Illegally Obtained Indirect Evidence in the Criminal
Process’ (1989) 39 Poinika Chronika 545 at 554 (in Greek); Ch. Satlanis, Tape Recordings as Evidence in the
Criminal Process (A Parallel Contribution to the Evidential Prohibitions Doctrine) Poinika No. 48 (Ant. N.
Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Komotini, 1996) 57 (in Greek); D. Spinellis, ‘Evidential Prohibitions
in the Criminal Process’ (1986) 36 Poinika Chronika 865 at 880 (in Greek); A. Tzannetis, ‘Evidential
Prohibitions and Alternative Legal Obtaining of Evidence’ (1995) 35 Poinika Chronika 5 at 11 (in
Greek).
22 See Androulakis, above n. 21 at 181.
23 See Kostaras, above n. 21 at 178.
within Hellenic constitutional doctrine. Some commentators argue that the
Constitution itself dictates a balancing approach.24 Nikolaos Androulakis noted,
for example, that the ‘revelation of truth in criminal trials as well as the discovery
and punishment of crimes constitute principles of a constitutional nature’.25 From
this point of view, the pursuit of truth has a constitutional footing equal to that of
individual rights enshrined in the Constitution. As a result—the argument
goes—the conflict between the pursuit of truth and the protection of individual
rights cannot be resolved ex ante and in abstracto, but only through a judicial
balancing exercise in concreto.26
Yet this interpretation has a fundamental flaw, which Argirios Karras pinpointed
with illuminating precision:
The balancing exercise has already been conducted by the constitu-
tional legislator. Its outcome is reflected in the Constitution itself or
in other statutes, which sanction—directly or indirectly—the relevant
evidential prohibitions. Thus, when an evidential prohibition is
instituted—either constitutionally or through simple statutory provi-
sions—the legal order accepts that this prohibition may render more
difficult, or even impossible, the efficient administration of criminal
justice and the pursuit of truth, and yet it proceeds to the intro-
duction of this prohibition, having obviously first balanced the
competing values and chosen the protection of a particular legal
value over the efficient administration of criminal justice and the
pursuit of truth […] As a consequence, there can be no further
balancing by the judge, otherwise the relevant provision [containing
the evidential prohibition] is bypassed and the evidential prohibition
is undermined […] If a judge retains the discretion to decide in each
case whether illegally obtained evidence can be used, it is possible
that fundamental provisions [protective of the defendant] will be
completely overturned.27
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24 On the basis of article 96 para. 1 and article 25 para. 1 of the Constitution. See Androulakis, above
n. 21 at 181; Spinellis, above n. 21 at 880; G. Triadafillou, ‘Evidential Prohibitions and the Propor-
tionality Principle’ (2007) 57 Poinika Chronika 295.
25 Androulakis, above n. 21 at 181.
26 See Dalakouras, above n. 21 at 60.
27 A. Karras, Criminal Procedural Law, 2nd edn (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Komotini, 1998)
640–1 (in Greek). With reference to secrecy of correspondence, Tsakirakis notes that ‘the judge has
no scope for his own balancing. He is entirely restricted by the Constitution’. See above n. 9 at 1006.
Karras’s argument inevitably leads to automatic exclusion. It leaves no space for
balancing and discretion,28 striking a fatal blow to the ‘theory of balancing’. Not
everyone is persuaded by ‘balancing’ in any case.29 Some commentators point to a
serious risk of arbitrary decisions and lack of legal certainty as a result of
balancing.30 Considering these risks, even commentators adhering to balancing
stress the importance of conducting the balancing exercise only in accordance
with specific criteria, such as the seriousness of the crime, the gravity of the proce-
dural violation, the reliability of the contested evidence, the need to protect the
person who has been the victim of the procedural violation, the availability of
other evidence or the possibility that the evidence in question could have been
legally obtained.31 Moreover, proportionality is seen as a key component of
balancing.32 In general, the view that only a structured discretion could achieve a
compromise between flexibility and legal certainty is shared by supporters of the
‘theory of balancing’.33 Some of these commentators even maintain that certain
rights cannot be subjected to balancing at all.34 Others, however, reject balancing
altogether, insisting that exclusion is inherent in certain constitutional rights.35
The rise of automatic exclusionary rules
Although Hellenic law on improperly obtained evidence developed exclusively
through judicial interpretation36 for most of the 20th century, Parliament’s inter-
vention was ultimately decisive, resulting in a solution diametrically opposed to
the ‘theory of balancing’. Faced with widespread use of telephone intercepts
outside the court (by radio reporters, newspapers, etc.) and amidst intense
political controversy,37 Parliament introduced article 370Δ para. 1 of the Penal
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28 Karras (above n. 27) recognised, however, that there is scope for balancing in cases of technical
breaches of the Constitution.
29 See Kostaras, above n. 21 at 178.
30 See Tsakirakis, above n. 9 at 1004; Tzannetis, above n. 21 at 11.
31 See Dimitratos, above n. 21 at 51; Papageorgiou-Gonatas, above n. 21 at 559; Tzannetis, above n. 21
at 11.
32 See mainly Triadafillou, above n. 24. See also Kostaras, above n. 21 at 178.
33 Androulakis has recently noted that the theory is in need of ‘doctrinal taming’. N. Androulakis,
Foreword in Tz. Iliopoulou-Stragga, Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence—The Evidential Prohibition of
Article 19 para. 3 of the Revised Constitution (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Komotini, 2003) 18
(in Greek).
34 Dalakouras argued that the Constitution prohibited the use of confessions obtained through
torture, lie detectors, truth serums or hypnosis as well as the use of tangible evidence covertly
obtained through microphones, video or other surveillance equipment. See above n. 21 at 62.
35 See, e.g., Kaminis, above n. 10 at 37–41.
36 This is an interesting feature of the law on improperly obtained evidence in Greece, if one
considers the preponderant role of the legislator in the civil law tradition. See generally R. David
and C. J. Spinosi, Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains (Éditions Dalloz: Paris, 1992) 84.
37 See Tsakirakis, above n. 9 at 995 and 1007.
Code in 1991,38 which extended criminal liability for covertly recording private
conversations and acts not taking place in the public domain to include
recordings made by a party to the conversation. This filled a substantial legislative
gap that the courts had long exploited to secure the admission of covert
recordings.39 Crucially, a specific exclusionary rule was attached to this provision
by article 370Δ para. 2 PC, prohibiting the use in any criminal proceedings, or in
proceedings before an investigative or other public authority, of evidence
obtained in violation of article 370Δ para. 1.
This was an absolute exclusionary rule that could ‘guarantee more efficiently and
ex ante the protection of privacy, without a balancing of competing interests by the
court being necessary’.40 In opting for such a radical solution, Parliament seemed
determined to put an end to the use of illegally obtained tape-recordings in trials.
In applying this rule, Arios Pagos held that ‘the use of an illegally recorded conver-
sation caused nullity of the judgment’,41 requiring the defendant’s conviction to
be quashed. Surprisingly, however, this exclusionary rule was abolished in 1993,
only two years after coming into effect. In its place, Parliament introduced a
criminal defence condoning the use in court of covertly obtained recordings when
intended to protect ‘justified interests’ of the parties (article 370A para. 4 PC42). In
so doing, Parliament reversed the position it had taken in 1991, and it looked like
the end of the road for automatic exclusion.
However, Parliament’s experimentations with the law of improperly obtained
evidence continued through the 1990s. In 1996 article 177 para. 2 was inserted
into the Code of Penal Procedure, mandating the exclusion of evidence obtained
through the commission of a criminal offence. Most radically, in 2001 Parliament
adopted article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution, expressly inserting an exclusionary
rule into the constitutional text. Before examining these two provisions in detail,
it is first necessary to describe the procedural context within which they function
as an essential prelude to comparative analysis.
2. Excluding evidence in Continental unitary courts
The question of barring the fact-finder’s access to improperly obtained evidence,
while fundamental to Anglo-American law, is irrelevant to Continental
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38 See article 31 para. 1 of Law 1941/ 1991.
39 See above at 184.
40 Th. Dalakouras, ‘The Exclusionary Rule for Improper Audio and Video Recordings under Article
370Δ para. 2 of the Penal Code (article 31 of Law 1941/ 1991)’ (1992) Iperaspisi 25 at 27 (in Greek).
41 Arios Pagos 589/ 1994, 42 Nomiko Bima 1059. See also Arios Pagos 9/ 1994, 44 Poinika Chronika 215.
42 Introduced with article 33 para. 8 of Law 2172/ 1993 and amended with article 12 para. 8 of Law
3090/ 2002.
jurisprudence. The division between bifurcated and unitary courts is crucial to
understanding this difference of perspective.43 In Continental unitary courts, the
fact-finder is a professional judge who decides both the admissibility of evidence
and the question of guilt. In this context, ‘exclusion’ of improperly obtained
evidence simply means the fact-finder is obliged to ignore the tainted evidence
when he decides on guilt; exclusion has little in common with insulating the
fact-finder from accessing improperly obtained evidence. In Anglo-American trials
the emphasis is placed on averting contamination of the fact-finding process by
tainted evidence. More specifically, in Anglo-American bifurcated courts the trial
judge decides the admissibility of evidence in a voir dire or pre-trial hearing and the
jury determines guilt without accessing evidence that has been ‘excluded’ in the
literal sense of the word.
There is no voir dire when parties seek to adduce evidence during the trial phase in
Greece. Professional judges who finally determine the issue of guilt also decide the
admissibility of evidence. A ruling that certain evidence is prohibited as a conse-
quence of falling within the scope of an exclusionary rule simply means judges
have to disregard such evidence when they reflect on the question of guilt. If they
do base a finding of guilt on prohibited evidence, the conviction is null and void,
and should be automatically quashed upon appellate review.
The question that inevitably arises is how realistic it is to expect that this duty to
disregard improperly obtained evidence will prevent the fact-finder from relying
on such evidence when deciding on guilt. Mirjan Damaška argued that ‘where the
same individuals decide the admissibility of evidence and the weight it deserves,
the taint from the forbidden but persuasive information cannot be avoided: it
always affects the decision maker’s thinking’.44 Exclusion under these circum-
stances ‘easily produces an excursion into unreality’,45 so that ‘the occasional
identity in the wording of Continental and Anglo-American exclusionary rules can
thus be deceptive’.46
Damaška’s analysis implies that, irrespective of how far-reaching they may appear
to be, in reality Continental exclusionary rules offer only hollow protections.
However, this criticism loses some of its force when one considers that Conti-
nental courts have to explain their findings through reasoned opinions. Since
professional judges have to indicate the evidentiary basis for their findings of
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43 See M. Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (Yale University Press: New Haven & London, 1997) 46.
44 Ibid. at 47.
45 Ibid. at 48.
46 Ibid. at 50. See also M. Damaška, ‘Free Proof and its Detractors’ (1995) 43 American Journal of
Comparative Law 343 at 350–2.
guilt, appellate courts are well equipped to check whether prohibited evidence
has been relied upon. An efficient system of appellate review thus reduces the
significance of procedural divergence between Anglo-American and Continental
systems in relation to improperly obtained evidence. Having said that, the risk
remains that the opinion may omit reference to evidence that judges have taken
into account in spite of their duty to disregard. Referring specifically to the
operation of exclusionary rules in Germany, Craig Bradley drew attention to cases
where ‘the suppressed evidence is not obviously necessary to support a finding of
guilt but is in reality the dispositive factor in the minds of the fact finders’.47
On the other hand, this criticism applies only to situations where a party seeks to
have evidence admitted during the trial phase where there has been no previous
opportunity to challenge its admissibility. Continental procedure normally
provides parties with the opportunity to contest the admissibility of evidence at
the pre-trial phase, usually by an application to the judicial chamber responsible
for supervising the pre-trial investigation. In Greece, judicial chambers of courts
of first instance48 have jurisdiction to nullify irregular procedural acts conducted
during the pre-trial phase.49 If an act is conducted in breach of procedural
standards, the act is null and void, and consequently without any legal effect.50 For
example, if the judicial chamber finds that a police search has been conducted
without the appropriate authorisation, the search will be pronounced null and
void and any evidence discovered during that search will not be admissible. Since
inadmissible evidence has to be suppressed from the investigation dossier,
judicial chamber review during the pre-trial phase can be regarded as the equiv-
alent of the Anglo-American voir dire or pre-trial hearing.51
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47 Bradley, ‘The Exclusionary Rule in Germany’, above n. 4 at 1064. For similar criticism of
exclusionary rules in Italy and Greece see E. Grande, ‘Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and
Resistance’ (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 227 at 248; and Dimitratos, above n. 21 at
71, respectively.
48 The chamber is a panel of three professional judges of a court of first instance (articles 5 para. 1 and
305 of the Code of Penal Procedure: ‘CPP’). It decides on committal to trial following the
culmination of the investigation phase. The most usual avenue for a procedural act to be nullified
is by appealing the judicial chamber decision that takes the case to trial. However, a nullity
application can also be made during the investigation phase, prior to and independently of the
committal decision. See judicial chamber of the Court of Appeal of Athens 1716/ 2000, 3 Poiniki
Dikeosini 838. The judicial chamber most often decides in the absence of the parties. For criticism
see Androulakis, above n. 21 at 323.
49 Article 176 CPP.
50 Articles 170–176 CPP.
51 It is equally important that the decision of the judicial chamber is subject to appellate review by a
judicial chamber of the Court of Appeal (article 478 CPP). Arios Pagos also reviews pronouncements
of nullity (article 482 CPP), even ex officio, at the cassation level (article 171 CPP).
3. Excluding improperly obtained evidence in Greece: legislation and
jurisprudence
Greece has developed two separate doctrinal bases for excluding improperly
obtained evidence in criminal trials. The first is located in the Code of Penal
Procedure, whereas the second exclusionary jurisdiction is to be found in the text
of the Constitution. This section examines the scope and rationale of each
exclusionary rule, before turning to consider how these legislative provisions have
been developed in practice by the courts.
The exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by the commission of criminal offences
Article 177 para. 1 of the Code of Penal Procedure sanctions the principle of
freedom of proof, which has the dual meaning of freedom to use any available
evidence and freedom to evaluate evidence without being restricted by technical
evidentiary rules.52 In 1996, however, Parliament provided for a specific exception
to this principle by inserting a second paragraph to article 177:
Evidence obtained by [the commission of] criminal offences or
through such offences will not be considered with regard to the
pronouncement of legal guilt, the imposition of criminal punishment
or the determination of restrictive measures, unless [the process
concerns] crimes where maximum punishment is life imprisonment
and the court makes a judgment that specifically justifies [the consid-
eration of such evidence].53
Article 177 para. 2 introduced a rule of automatic inadmissibility making the
commission of criminal offences the sole criterion for exclusion.54 With the
exception of ‘life imprisonment offences’,55 the rule is wide in scope, at least in
theory, as it is not limited to specified offences.56 Moreover, this rule applies to all
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52 A. Karras, ‘Free Evaluation of Proof and “Cassation Court” Review’ in Hellenic Association of Penal
Law (ΕΕΠΔ), above n. 21 at 9.
53 Introduced with article 2 para. 7 of Law 2408/ 1996.
54 Whether the criminal offence has been committed is determined at the trial in which a party seeks
to adduce the relevant evidence. The coincidence of criminal prosecution against the person who
is accused of having committed this offence does not delay determination of the admissibility
issue (see article 177 para. 2 CPP in fine).
55 Provision of a maximum of ‘life imprisonment’ is a rarity in Hellenic law. The majority of serious
offences provide for a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment. See article 52 PC.
56 In reality, however, its use has been limited to offences against the secrecy of correspondence,
notably the offence punished by article 370A PC.
stages of the criminal process and endorses the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’
doctrine.57
Article 177 para. 2 is a particularly wide extrinsic exclusionary rule: ‘a rule
rejecting probative information for the sake of values unrelated to the pursuit of
truth’.58 Admitting evidence obtained by the commission of criminal offences
arguably undermines the values implicit in these prohibitions. When constitu-
tional values are implicated in criminal law, the exclusion of evidence vindicates
the constitutional values underpinning relevant offences. Thus, the exclusion of
evidence obtained through a violation of constitutionally protected private corre-
spondence punishable by criminal law seeks to vindicate the constitutional right
to secrecy of correspondence.
Georgios Kaminis argues that protecting the integrity of the criminal justice
system is the main rationale behind this exclusionary rule. Taking his lead from
the ‘life imprisonment offences’ exception, Kaminis reasons that ‘the integrity [of
the criminal justice system] is at stake when evidence obtained by illegal acts of
private parties or state authorities is used in a criminal process. It is equally at
stake though when defendants guilty of serious crimes are acquitted’.59 However,
this interpretation underplays the emphasis placed on constitutional rights
during the parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of article 177 para. 2,
and is contradicted by the explicitly rights-centred approach of the text. Evidence
is automatically excluded, except with regard to ‘life imprisonment offences’,
irrespective of the impact of an acquittal on the integrity of the criminal justice
system. Arios Pagos has confirmed that article 177 para. 2 serves to protect individ-
uals’ fundamental rights in priority to the pursuit of truth and the efficient
administration of justice.60 Kaminis does not deny this, but rather argues that ‘the
protection of individual rights does not constitute the main61 objective of the
evidential prohibition’ in article 177; instead, this objective ‘is realised indirectly
and as a reflection [of protecting integrity] only’.62
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57 See N. Dimitratos, ‘The Evolution of the Institution of Evidential Prohibitions in Hellenic Criminal
Procedural Law—Simultaneously, a Comparative Review of the Correspondent American and
German Law’ (2001) 51 Poinika Chronika 5 at 11 (in Greek); Karras, above n. 27 at 638; A. Tzannetis,
‘The Unlawful Obtaining of Evidence (Interpretative Approach of Article 177 para. 2 of the Code of
Penal Procedure)’ (1998) 48 Poinika Chronika 105 at 107 (in Greek).
58 Damaška, above n. 43 at 12.
59 Kaminis, above n. 10 at 280.
60 Arios Pagos 1351/ 1997, 48 Poinika Chronika 965.
61 My emphasis.
62 Kaminis, above n. 10 at 278.
A rule that renders the commission of criminal offences the only criterion for
exclusion entails that unconstitutionally obtained evidence might still be
admissible in cases where no criminal offence has been committed. This is
problematic, given that ‘the constitutional protection of individual rights and
the criminal law protection of corresponding legal values do not necessarily
coincide’.63 In other words, an act that violates the Constitution is not always
punishable by criminal law.64 For this reason, an exclusionary rule that revolves
exclusively around criminal acts may be letting unconstitutional acts slip through
its protective net.
In this regard, article 177 para. 2 arguably fails to realise its intended objectives.
This provision was introduced into Parliament by Evangelos Venizelos, the
eminent Professor of Constitutional Law and, at that time, Minister of Justice.
Venizelos pointed out that the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained
recordings of private conversations should reflect the original position of Arios
Pagos concerning unconstitutionally seized letters.65 He argued that ‘evidential
prohibitions stem from constitutional provisions and from provisions contained
in international documents for the protection of individual rights’.66 He added
that constitutional guarantees were deprived of substance if they did not lead to
evidential prohibitions.67 But in the event, article 177 para. 2 was tied to the
protection of values preserved by criminal law, which fails to give the provision its
full effect in protecting constitutional rights.
For example, article 177 para. 2 is entirely pre-empted when the criminal offence
by which the evidence has been obtained can be justified or excused under the
application of a criminal law defence, such as the defences of necessity or
self-defence. The absence of legal guilt in such a case68 means no offence has been
committed and, therefore, the evidence will be admitted irrespective of whether it
has been obtained by the violation of a constitutional right. A classic hypothetical
posits the victim of blackmail who secretly records her blackmailer’s threats. If the
act of recording this conversation can be justified as self-defence (and therefore
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63 D. Spinellis, ‘Legal Values and their Importance in the Modern Teaching of Criminal Law’ (1971) 21
Poinika Chronika 812 (in Greek). See also N. Livos, ‘The Penal Protection of Traffic Data of Telecom-
munications’ (1997) 47 Poinika Chronika 737 at 742 (in Greek).
64 Kaminis, above n. 10 at 281.
65 Parliamentary Debates, Proceedings of May 7, 1996, p. 6042; May 9, 1996, p. 6149.
66 Ibid. May 9, 1996, p. 6149.
67 Ibid.
68 The judgment as to whether the supposed criminal offence can be justified under a criminal
defence is made in the course of the trial in which the party seeks to adduce the evidential item in
question.
non-criminal), use of the evidence thus obtained would be admissible at trial
despite its having been procured through the violation of a fundamental constitu-
tional right.69 This illustrates why, in a legal system prioritising constitutional
rights, it does not make sense to confuse the separate issues of criminal liability
with the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence.
To my knowledge, however, there is no reported case where illegally obtained
evidence was admitted as a result of the operation of a general criminal law
defence. The true dimensions of the problem become more apparent when the
partial defence applicable to illegal telephone intercepts or recordings of
face-to-face private conversations is considered. Thus, while the use of such inter-
cepts is proscribed by article 370A para. 3 of the Penal Code, para. 4 of the same
article states that the use of illegal intercepts is not ‘wrong’ when the use has
taken place before a judicial or other investigative authority for the protection of a
justified interest that could not be protected otherwise. Given the breadth of the
notion of ‘justified interest’, this provision might considerably circumscribe the
scope of the exclusionary rule under article 177 para. 2.70
Equally restrictive is the ‘life imprisonment offences’ exception, covering offences
such as murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated forms of drug offences, arson,
causing explosions and constructing or possessing explosives. In light of the
seriousness of the offences punished with life imprisonment, discretionary
exclusion substitutes for the automatic exclusionary rule. Again, however, this
exception runs contrary to the protection of constitutional rights. The Consti-
tution does not distinguish between individuals who are charged with serious
crimes and those who are not. It protects rights of individuals in general. In fact, it
is in relation to serious crimes, with correspondingly severe penalties, that consti-
tutional protection is most needed.71
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69 See generally Dimitratos, above n. 57 at 13; Livos, above n. 63 at 747; Tzannetis, above n. 57 at 107.
70 See, e.g., Arios Pagos 2383/ 2003, 3 Poinikos Logos 2556. Applying article 370A para. 4, Arios Pagos
held that the use of intercepts in order to prove the guilt of the defendant was a justified interest that
could not be protected otherwise. Such use did not amount to the criminal offence provided by
article 370A para. 3 and article 177 para. 2 did not apply. The evidence had therefore rightly been
admitted.
71 See A. Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ [1977] Crim LR 723; A. Ashworth, Human
Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2002) 112. See also Mirfield,
above n. 3 at 31–3, demonstrating that a ‘serious offences’ exception could not be justified under
any of the exclusionary principles. See contra J. Kaplan, ‘The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule’ (1974)
26 Stanford Law Review 1027 at 1046–9.
All in all, article 177 para. 2 is marked by considerable contradictions. It indicates
that in 1996 Parliament wanted to take a radical step in the direction of automatic
exclusion, but was also influenced by public interest considerations that would
necessarily qualify the scope for exclusion. This resulted in a rule that generally
puts rights first, but also provides for important exceptions, with the further
potential for confusion and uncertainty.
The constitutional exclusionary rule for violations of the right to privacy
The 2001 revision of the Constitution revolved around the protection of individual
rights,72 with the right to privacy a notable area of significant developments.73 In
looking for ways to enforce this right, Parliament introduced article 19 para. 3 of
the Constitution:
Use of evidence acquired in violation of the present article [article 19
para. 1] and of articles 9 and 9A is prohibited.
Articles 19 para. 1, 9 and 9A of the Constitution, respectively, protect the right to
secrecy of correspondence, the sanctity of a person’s home and inviolability of his
private and family life, and place restriction on the use of his personal data. The
use of evidence obtained in violation of any of these broadly-based privacy rights
(privacy lato sensu) is now constitutionally prohibited. The exclusionary rule
contained in article 19 para. 3 is an important innovation, when viewed in
comparative perspective, since it simultaneously possesses the following three
characteristics: it is constitutional, automatic and absolute.
First, the fact that the exclusionary rule is now part and parcel of the Constitution
means that the rule has become ‘fundamental law’ (higher order law) and can-
not be abolished by statute or other act of Government.74 Instead, any statutory
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72 Fourteen out of the 22 articles of Part B of the Constitution have been amended. See also
K. Chrisogonos, Individual and Social Rights, 2nd edn (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-
Komotini, 2002) 12 (in Greek).
73 An innovative right to be ‘protected from the collection, processing and use, especially by
electronic means, of personal data’ (article 9A) has been added to the Constitution. Likewise,
article 19 para. 2 provided for the institution of an independent authority for the protection of
secrecy of correspondence.
74 Abolition or amendment is possible only through the particularly complex process of constitu-
tional revision. See article 110 of the Constitution. The Constitution of 1975 was revised twice, in
1986 and 2001, and is currently undergoing a new revision process.
legislation infringing this rule must be amended.75 At a more abstract level, there
is a strong symbolism attached to the incorporation of this rule in the constitu-
tional text. Furthermore, exclusion under article 19 para. 3 is automatic. The court
does not have any discretion to admit evidence obtained in breach of the right to
privacy. The rule of exclusion must be applied mechanically once the relevant
constitutional violation has been established.76 Finally, the exclusionary rule is
absolute.77 The alternative of a less rigid rule was discussed in Parliament, but in
the interests of more effective constitutional rights protection the balance tipped
in favour of an absolute standard without any exceptions.78
The rule applies to all stages of the criminal process as well as to civil and adminis-
trative proceedings,79 and to derivative evidence. Violations by private individuals
are covered no less than violations of constitutional rights by the state, since
constitutional rights in Greece apply erga omnes.80 This is of great significance for
Continental criminal procedure given that private individuals—especially crime
victims—actively participate in criminal proceedings against the defendant as
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75 E. Venizelos, ‘The Constitutional Acquis’—The Constitutional Phenomenon in the 21st Century and the Contri-
bution of the Revision of 2001 (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Komotini, 2002) 148 (in Greek).
Following the introduction of article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution, the Authority for the
Protection of Personal Data (APPD) held that the ‘life imprisonment offences’ exception of article
177 para. 2 CPP and the partial defence of article 370A para. 4 PC should be abolished. See APPD 83/
2002, 53 Poinika Chronika 80. These provisions are no longer compatible with the Constitution.
See Charalabakis, above n. 15 at 1067; G. Kaminis, ‘The Problem of Illegally Obtained Evidence in
the Criminal Process after the Revision of Article 19 of the Constitution’ in Volume in Honour of
Ioannis Manoledakis, Democracy—Liberty—Security (Sakkoulas Editions: Athens-Thessaloniki, 2005)
337 at 345–60 (in Greek); D. Kioupis, Comment on Arios Pagos 1317/ 2001, 1 Poinikos Logos 1822 at
1829 (in Greek); G. Tsolias, Comment on Arios Pagos 1568/ 2004, (2005) 8 Poiniki Dikeosini 295 at
297–8 (in Greek). See contra Triadafillou, above n. 24, who argues that article 370A para. 4 is not
incompatible with article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution.
76 Of course, there is discretion as to defining the scope of the right to privacy. The fact-finder, who
decides both the question of admissibility and the question of guilt, must first decide whether a
violation of the right to privacy has occurred.
77 Commentators agree on this point. See K. Kokkinakis, ‘The Importance of Article 19 para. 3 for the
Criminal Process’ (2001) 4 Poiniki Dikeosini 876 (in Greek); X. Kontiadis, The New Constitutionalism and
Fundamental Rights after the Revision of 2001 (Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers: Athens-Konotini, 2002) 159
(in Greek); S. Paulou, A. Fountedaki and G. Dimitrainas, ‘Evidential Prohibitions and Adoption’
(2002) 5 Poiniki Dikeosini 915 at 921 (in Greek); S. Papageorgiou-Gonatas, ‘Evidential Prohibitions as
Expressions of Constitutional Mandates’ (2003) 3 Poinikos Logos 17 at 25 (in Greek); Tsolias, above n.
75 at 298; Venizelos, above n. 75 at 147.
78 See Commission for the Revision of the Constitution, Proceedings of September 13, 2000, cited by
Tsiris, above n. 9 at 72–3. See also Kontiadis, ibid. at 158–9.
79 Venizelos, above n. 75 at 148.
80 Article 25 of the Constitution states that constitutional rights ‘also apply to relations between
private individuals […]’. See, in that regard, D. Giannoulopoulos, ‘The Illusion of Privacy’ (2006) 156
New Law Journal 572.
‘civil parties’81 and can submit incriminating evidence to the court. Furthermore,
the exclusionary rule applies even in cases where evidence has been obtained
through a violation of the right to privacy of a person other than the defendant.82
Finally, a conviction relying on evidence obtained in violation of the right to
privacy will be quashed upon appellate review on grounds of nullity. When a
conviction is quashed, the court will often order a new trial.
Thus, article 19 para. 3 gives a categorical, and novel,83 answer to the ‘perennial
dilemma’84 at the centre of the debate on improperly obtained evidence. It puts
primary emphasis on the protection of rights, communicating the idea that the
pursuit of truth, though cardinal, is not an absolute principle of criminal
procedure. More specifically, it signals that the right to privacy cannot be sacri-
ficed in the name of the efficient investigation of crime, which must be pursued
within the parameters prescribed by the Constitution.85 Article 19 para. 3 is a
means to ‘reinforce the efficacy of constitutional provisions protecting private
life’,86 reflecting the dominant view among Greek scholars that the exclusion of
unconstitutionally seized evidence is inextricably linked with the protection of
constitutional rights.87 Article 19 para. 3 translates the ideology of the protective
principle into concrete practice.
Yet, for all its progressive character and wide scope, article 19 para. 3 is at the same
time unduly narrow. The rule applies only to violations of privacy, while the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of other constitutional rights turns
either on the application of article 177 para. 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure or
judicial interpolation of an evidential prohibition into particular rights. Treating
privacy violations differently from other constitutional violations is not easily
justified. The right to privacy is a ‘qualified right’ and, accordingly, there is no
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81 See articles 63–70 CPP.
82 Papageorgiou-Gonatas, above n. 77 at 25–6.
83 Iliopoulou-Stragga observes that article 19 para. 3 is a ‘European, if not universal, innovation’. See
above n. 20 at 2219.
84 See A. Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989) 343.
85 For example, article 19 para. 1 of the Constitution provides for interference with the right to
secrecy of correspondence ‘for reasons of national security or for the purpose of investigating
especially serious crime’, but the interference must be taking place in accordance with the
relevant statutory scheme (Law 2225/ 1994 as amended with Law 3115/ 2003). This means that
evidence obtained through interceptions authorised under this scheme is admissible. Article 19
para. 3 is not a blanket rule of inadmissibility with the potential to ‘harm’ law enforcement
beyond the extent mandated by the Constitution.
86 Kontiadis, above n. 77 at 159.
87 See Dalakouras, above n. 40 at 30; Spinellis, above n. 21 at 879; Dimitratos, above n. 21 at 31;
Kostaras, above n. 21 at 176; Papageorgiou-Gonatas, above n. 77 at 21; Paulou, Fountedaki and
Dimitrainas, above n. 77 at 920; Satlanis, above n. 21 at 20–2.
logic in protecting it more rigidly than ‘absolute rights’88 such as the right against
torture89 or the right to respect for human dignity.90 The effect of article 19 para. 3
ought to be extended through teleological interpretation to include the violation
of any constitutional right. This would also pre-empt a possible argument a
contrario that the use of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights
other than the right to privacy is permitted.91 Meanwhile, the combination of
article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution and article 177 para. 2 of the Code of Penal
Procedure constitutes a stringent mandatory exclusion regime encompassing
both illegally and unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
Exclusion in practice: judicial developments
The use of evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy led Arios Pagos to
quash a number of convictions from the mid 1990s onwards.92 The turning point
was in 2001 when, prior to the introduction of article 19 para. 3, Arios Pagos, in
plenary, strongly condemned the use of such evidence.93 The court read an
evidential prohibition into the Constitution, as it had previously in cases of
improperly seized letters. This decision set the tone for the case law that followed.
In a case in 2002 where the defendant had been convicted of bribery on the basis
of a tape-recorded conversation, the conviction was quashed since it was not
clear whether the recording had been lawfully obtained.94 This case demon-
strates that the defendant bears no burden of proof on this issue. Any doubts as
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88 For a discussion of the division between ‘absolute’ and ‘qualified’ rights in the context of the
European Convention, see generally A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 3rd edn
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005) 35–7; F. Sudre, ‘La dimension internationale et européenne
des libertés et droits fondamentaux’ in R. Cabrillac, M. A. Frichon-Roche and T. Revet (dir.), Libertés
et droits fondamentaux, 11th edn (Editions Dalloz: Paris, 2005) 32 at 41–4.
89 Article 7 para. 2 of the Constitution.
90 Article 2 para. 1 of the Constitution.
91 See D. Giannoulopoulos, Comment on Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 6 Poiniki Dikeosini 614 at 628 (in
Greek).
92 See Arios Pagos 9/ 1994, 44 Poinika Chronika 215, where Arios Pagos quashed a conviction for
rape and ordered a new trial as a result of the use in court of recordings of telephone conver-
sations between the victim and the defendant. The recordings had been surreptitiously obtained
by the victim. See also Arios Pagos (in plenary) 17/ 1993, 43 Poinika Chronika 1105 (regarding
exclusion in the context of an administrative process); Arios Pagos 215/ 2000, 50 Poinika
Chronika 688.
93 Arios Pagos held that the administration of justice did not justify the use of unconstitutional
means, that the surreptitious recording of a conversation violated the right to secrecy of
correspondence and, therefore, that its evidential use was constitutionally prohibited. Arios Pagos
1/ 2001, 49 Nomiko Bima 1803. See also Charalabakis, above n. 15 at 1066–7.
94 See Arios Pagos 297/ 2002, 3 Praksi & Logos tou Poinikou Dikeou 33. For the offence of bribery, see
articles 235-237 PC.
to the provenance of contested evidence work in his favour.95 In another case,
Arios Pagos quashed a conviction for insurance fraud,96 where a witness had
installed a listening device that allowed her to eavesdrop on the defendant’s
discussions from a distance of a hundred metres.97 The conviction was quashed
on grounds of nullity, since the witness’s testimony was derivative evidence
arising from interference with the defendant’s constitutionally protected
private conversations. The time limits for prosecution having elapsed in this
case, moreover, a new trial could not be ordered.98 In pre-trial proceedings in
2005, the judicial chamber of the Court of Appeal of Piraeus had committed the
defendant to be tried on forgery charges,99 relying on information derived from a
recorded conversation between the civil party and an employee of the defendant.
Even though the recording had been obtained by an infringement of the rights of
a third party—the rights of an employee of the defendant—Arios Pagos reversed
the decision to commit for trial, since the use of the information obtained via the
recording had breached article 177 para. 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure.100
Finally, in another case from 2005, the judicial chamber of the Court of Appeal of
Athens had committed the defendant to be tried for counselling fraud,101 relying
on an illegally intercepted conversation between the defendant’s spouse and a
co-defendant.102 The evidence had again been obtained in violation of the right to
privacy of a third party, and Arios Pagos reversed the decision. It is apparent from
these decisions that the courts have applied the exclusionary rules rigidly in
several cases.
However, the courts have also sought to introduce exceptions to automatic
exclusion or to avoid its application altogether in some other cases. Improperly
obtained exculpatory evidence has proved to be a particularly challenging issue.
Arios Pagos initially interpreted article 177 para. 2 as being compatible with the
defendant’s reliance on such evidence.103 Hellenic scholarship concurred on this
point.104 However, the introduction by article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution of an
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95 The view is taken in Greece that the in dubio pro reo principle and the presumption of innocence
militate against burdens of proof, even evidential ones. See Androulakis, above n. 21 at 192–7.
96 Article 388 para. 1 PC.
97 See Arios Pagos 1568/ 2004, 8 Poiniki Dikeosini 295.
98 The time limit for the prosecution of such an offence is five years. See article 111 para. 3 PC.
99 Article 216 PC.
100 See Arios Pagos 1622/ 2005, 56 Poinika Chronika 426. The case was sent back to the judicial
chamber to decide whether to proceed to trial or not.
101 See articles 386 and 46 para. 1(a) PC.
102 See Arios Pagos 2035/ 2005, 56 Poinika Chronika 538.
103 Arios Pagos 1351/ 1997, 48 Poinika Chronika 965.
104 See Androulakis, above n. 21 at 182; Dalakouras, above n. 21 at 55; Dimitratos, above n. 21 at 52;
Kaminis, above n. 9 at 518–19; Karras, above n. 27 at 641; Kostaras, above n. 21 at 180.
ostensibly absolute exclusionary rule was seen by some commentators as going so
far as to prohibit the use of unconstitutionally obtained exonerating evidence.105
Nevertheless, Arios Pagos recently held, rightly in my view, that preventing a
defendant from using evidence that could prove his innocence would violate the
overarching constitutional right to respect of human dignity (article 2 para. 1 of
the Constitution) and that courts should therefore admit exonerating evidence,
albeit subject to certain conditions. More specifically, Arios Pagos mentioned a
proportionality requirement, that the gravity of the offence should be taken into
account and, most important, that the evidence in question should be the only
exonerating evidence available to the defendant.106 This decision demonstrates
the need to balance the constitutional right to privacy with respect for human
dignity in such cases.
This balancing exercise is further complicated when the exonerating evidence
that the defendant (D1) seeks to adduce has been obtained by violating the right to
privacy of a co-defendant (D2), for example when D1 has covertly recorded a
conversation with D2, which is exonerating for D1 but inculpates D2. Arios Pagos
indicates that such evidence is admissible: the fact-finder should take the exoner-
ating part into account when deciding on D1’s guilt, but must then disregard the
incriminatory part when deciding on D2’s guilt.107 However, D1 still has to argue
that the evidence he seeks to adduce is the only exonerating evidence available to
him.108 This jurisprudence effects a delicate compromise between respecting D1’s
right to human dignity, which would be seriously undermined if he were wrongly
convicted as a result of not being able to adduce exonerating evidence, and D2’s
right to privacy, which would be equally damaged if evidence obtained in breach
of the relevant constitutional protection were admitted. Whether the fact-finder
can realistically be expected to disregard the incriminating part of the evidence
once he becomes aware of it is another question, which in these circumstances
cannot be addressed through suppression of the evidence.
This is a rare example of an exception to evidentiary exclusion inspired by the
need to safeguard the rights of the defendant. It contrasts with other Arios Pagos
jurisprudence tending to undermine the protective effect of article 177 para. 2 of
the Code of Penal Procedure and article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution. In a 2001
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105 See, e.g., Iliopoulou-Stragga, above n. 20 at 2204.
106 Arios Pagos 42/ 2004, 4 Poinikos Logos 66.
107 See Arios Pagos 1351/ 1997, 48 Poinika Chronika 965.
108 See Arios Pagos 42/ 2004, 4 Poinikos Logos 66. In this case a covertly recorded tape exonerating D1
was not admitted, since D2 objected to its use and D1 had in fact submitted to the court other
exonerating evidence.
case,109 a video camera had been covertly installed in church premises where
money and other items dedicated to the church were kept. A priest was charged
with theft and 15 videotapes were submitted to court showing him stealing the
money. In a similar case decided in 2004, a video camera had been secretly
installed in a shop. Twenty-eight video stills were produced in court showing an
employee committing theft.110 In both cases, Arios Pagos concentrated on whether
the evidence had been obtained by the commission of the offence of ‘improperly
recording non-public acts’ (article 370A para. 2 PC). It gave a negative answer to
this question: the relevant acts were not non-public (private) since they were
conducted ‘in the context of administrative duties [which were] subject to public
control and public criticism’.111 Article 177 para. 2 consequently did not apply and
use of the recordings was lawful.
These decisions have rightly been criticised for putting forward a restrictive inter-
pretation of the notion of private life.112 Their effect is that conduct related to
occupational activities falls outside the protective scope of the right to privacy,
irrespective of whether such conduct can be regarded as ‘private’ in a wider
sense.113 This may be an example of inflexible exclusionary rules leading to narrow
interpretations of the constitutional rights they are supposed to protect, calling to
mind an important criticism of automatic exclusion.114 One might respond by
pointing out that inflexible exclusionary rules oblige the courts to reflect openly
on the extent of constitutional limits, rather than, hypocritically, subscribing to
constitutional rights rhetoric while validating the use of evidence obtained in
violation of these very rights under a discretionary admissibility regime.
Finally, it can be argued that groundbreaking though it may be in theory, article
19 para. 3 has not yet had the dramatic impact in practice one would have
expected to see. In fact, courts have blatantly ignored it in some cases, applying
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109 Arios Pagos 1317/ 2001, 1 Poinikos Logos 1822.
110 Arios Pagos 874/ 2004, 5 Praksi & Logos tou Poinikou Dikeou 229.
111 Arios Pagos 1317/ 2001 and Arios Pagos 874/ 2004, above nn. 109 and 110 respectively.
112 Iliopoulou-Stragga, above n. 20 at 2201; Kioupis, above n. 75 at 1826.
113 It could be argued that in the above cases the recording was conducted in a place where the
public had no or limited access, implying that acts taking place there were of a private nature. See
Kioupis, ibid. at 1827.
114 See generally A. R. Amar, ‘Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy
Violations)’ (1997) 20 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 457 at 465; Mirfield, above n. 3 at 321–2;
D. Ormerod, ‘ECHR and the Exclusion of Evidence: Trial Remedies for Article 8 Breaches’ [2003]
Crim LR 61 at 72; W. Pizzi, Trials Without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal Trials Has Become an
Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It (New York University Press: New York and
London, 1999) 39. See also M. R. Wilkey, ‘A Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let
Congress and the Trial Courts Speak’ (1979) 62 Judicature 351 at 355, who points to ‘one most
salient vice of the exclusionary rule—[…] the judges are corrupted by the exclusionary rule’.
article 177 para. 2 instead.115 In addition, there is obiter dicta to the effect that the
‘life imprisonment offences’ exception of article 177 para. 2 remains valid.116
However, this exception is incompatible with article 19 para. 3 and should be
abolished.117 More specifically, the starting point should be that article 19 para. 3
prevails over any conflicting statutory provision. When dealing with violations of
the right to privacy, courts should apply article 19 para. 3 directly rather than
resort to article 177 para. 2. Post 2001, the Constitution itself prohibits the use of
evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy, independently of whether
that violation also constitutes a criminal offence.
4. Improperly obtained evidence in England and Wales: discretionary
exclusion and stays of the proceedings for abuse of process
English law on improperly obtained evidence is notoriously difficult to decipher.
Its discretionary nature leads to inconsistent case law and lack of legal certainty.118
Yet, it is well documented in relation to discretionary exclusion under s. 78(1) of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 that reliability considerations
reign supreme119 and that protection of rights is peripheral to pursuing accurate
fact-finding.120
Nowhere is this more evident than regarding evidence obtained in violation of
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the
right to respect for private life, home and correspondence.121 Recent case law
illustrates that, in spite of the ‘incorporation’ of the Convention, such evidence
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120 See B. Fitzpatrick and N. Taylor, ‘Human Rights and the Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence’
(2001) 65 JCL 349 at 358; P. Mirfield, ‘Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: Part 2:
Evidential Aspects’ [2001] Crim LR 91 at 101.
121 See R v Khan [1996] 3 All ER 289.
is readily admitted on the basis of its strength and cogency.122 This has sparked
some criticism and proposals for reform, ranging from moving to a structured
discretion123 to introducing a presumption of exclusion for specified rights,124
even a strong presumption that ‘should be able to be rebutted only by
compelling considerations in favour of the evidence being admitted’.125
However, commentators have stopped short of advocating automatic exclusion,
since this is considered too radical an option with no realistic prospect of being
adopted by English courts.126 In addition, scant support for this approach can be
derived from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which
has held that evidence obtained in violation of Article 8 does not necessarily
violate the right to a fair trial.127 Nor does it appear likely that automatic
exclusion will gain significant ground in the near future, given the general trend
within the English law of evidence to ‘move away from mandatory precepts and
detailed technicalities in the direction of structured discretion and more
flexible norms’.128
The English law on improperly obtained evidence is to a considerable extent
marked by a one-dimensional preoccupation with the pursuit of truth (intrinsic
policy considerations).129 It seems more in tune with ‘crime control’ than ‘due
process’ values130 and appears to rest on a consequentialist basis that allows rights
considerations to be sidestepped in pursuit of accurate fact-finding and the
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(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) 19–20.
130 See H. Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1968) 149–73.
For brief discussion on the questions of continuing applicability and value of the due process
and crime control models see L. Zedner, Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004)
116–18.
conviction of the guilty.131 In marked contrast, an approach much more
compatible with excluding evidence on ‘broader considerations of the integrity of
the criminal justice system’132 (extrinsic policy considerations) is taken in the field of
abuse of process. Andrew Choo and Susan Nash have observed that ‘the
narrowness of the discretion to exclude an item of “tainted” prosecution evidence
stands uneasily alongside the width of the discretion to discontinue a “tainted”
prosecution’.133
Interestingly, the gap between the two doctrines may now be closing. Reflecting
on A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2),134 Choo and Nash
suggest that this important decision ‘represents an acknowledgment that there
may be circumstances in which a court should be prepared, “on moral grounds”,
to exclude reliable evidence because of the way in which it was obtained’.135
Viewed in this light, exclusionary discretion may be pulled towards the wider
exclusionary orbit of abuse of process. It may be wise to sound a note of caution. A
and Others concerned evidence obtained in violation of the ius cogens absolute
prohibition against torture, and related to inherently unreliable confessional
evidence rather than tangible (real) evidence. Nonetheless, if the position
endorsed in A and Others were confirmed in future cases involving tangible
evidence and violations of qualified rights, a major step towards an approach
more compatible with excluding improperly obtained evidence on extrinsic policy
grounds would have been made.
Apart from s. 78 of PACE and abuse of process, brief reference to the English
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) is in order, given that
Hellenic law is mostly concerned with evidence obtained by intercepting private
communications. Section 17 of RIPA precludes any forensic use of com-
munications intercepted in the course of their transmission by means of a postal
service or telecommunication system136 and forbids all disclosures relating to an
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interception warrant.137 This is an automatic ‘rule of inadmissibility, there being
no discretion in the judge’.138 It is designed to protect the public interest in
‘[preserving] the secrecy of the warrant system’.139 In this way, s. 17 ‘limits the use
of material gathered from postal or telephone intercepts to an “intelligence”
rather than an “evidential” role’.140 Being a matter of public interest immunity
rather than evidentiary exclusion, s. 17 is not directly relevant to a comparison
between English and Hellenic law on improperly obtained evidence, irrespective
of the fact that it excludes from criminal trials a whole category of intercept
evidence.
Section 17 is limited to telephonic and postal intercepts. The admissibility of
evidence obtained by other forms of surveillance or covert human intelligence
sources is governed by the generally applicable fairness standard under s. 78 of
PACE. This means that with regard to most clandestine eavesdropping, surveil-
lance and tape-recording activity in both Greece and in England and Wales,
including covert recordings of face-to-face conversations and covert audio
recordings procured other than by telephone-tapping, there can only be a
comparison between discretionary exclusion in England and automatic exclusion
in Greece. Section 17 of RIPA therefore has only marginal bearing on a compar-
ative study of the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence in Hellenic and
English law.
5. The significance of Hellenic law on improperly obtained evidence for
England and Wales
Hellenic law offers a fine example of an exclusionary system that implements the
idea of ‘excluding evidence as protecting rights’. Andrew Ashworth explored this
idea in a seminal article in 1977,141 where he sketched the ‘protective principle’.
This principle signified that rights’ protection and the exclusion of evidence were
intertwined: ‘an infringement of an individual’s rights […] supplied a prima facie
justification for the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of that infringe-
ment’;142 exclusion was ‘necessary to vindicate those rights’.143 The protective
principle has had some impact in England and Wales, especially with regard to
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breaches of PACE.144 However. exclusion ‘remains firmly anchored in the
reliability rather than rights-based principle’.145 Greece, on the other hand, has
strongly endorsed the protective principle. Its exclusionary rules clearly gravitate
around the protection of constitutional rights, exclusion seen as the only means
to vindicate such rights. Hellenic law may therefore serve as an example and inspi-
ration for commentators in England and Wales who argue for an approach based
on the protective principle in opposition to the prevailing emphasis on reliability
(or emerging integrity and moral legitimacy principles);146 as well as to those who
advocate presumptive exclusion for the violation of certain constitutional or
Convention rights.147 At the very least, the Hellenic example reinforces the view, in
the context of discretionary exclusion, that the case for exclusion is surely
stronger when constitutional or Convention rights have been breached.148
The particular strength of Greece’s protective principle merits emphasis.
Ashworth has spoken of a qualified protective principle and of a prima facie justifi-
cation for exclusion.149 He argued that the protective principle would be better
linked with an exclusionary discretion150 and conceived its operation as largely
dependent upon the evidentiary impact of the rights violation in question. Thus,
evidence should be excluded, ‘unless the court is satisfied that the accused in fact
suffered no disadvantage as a result of the breach’.151 By contrast, exclusion in
Greece is not dependent upon such ‘post hoc rationalization of events’.152 There is
no in concreto review aimed at discovering whether the accused has actually been
disadvantaged as a result of a constitutional violation. Exclusion is rather seen as a
means to vindicate constitutional rights in abstracto.153
Secondly, automatic exclusion in Greece can be seen as a counterweight to the
predominance of discretionary approaches in the common law world. This
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counterweight role has traditionally been reserved for the exclusionary rules
derived from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the US Constitution. However,
relentless judicial undermining of the American exclusionary rule since the
1970s—including the recognition of deterrence-based exceptions to automatic
exclusion154—means that US law today supports only considerably qualified
exclusionary rules. The Hellenic exclusionary rules, by contrast, are automatic
and absolute. Exceptions previously carved out of article 177 para. 2 of the Code of
Penal Procedure are now incompatible with article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution
and can have no further effect, at least in relation to violations of the right to
privacy.
Another salient feature of automatic exclusion in Greece is its unusually wide
scope. As demonstrated above, the exclusionary rules apply to both illegally and
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.155 They apply at all stages of criminal
proceedings156 both to evidence directly tainted by the improper manner in which
it was obtained and to derivative evidence, whoever was responsible for obtaining
the evidence (state officials or private individuals) and regardless of whose rights
were infringed (defendant or third parties). Such a distinctive approach to
regulating improperly obtained evidence should not be overlooked when
weighing competing evidentiary regimes in the comparative balance.157
Developments in Hellenic law have been underpinned by a liberal constitutional
tradition incorporating a conception of the right to privacy as ‘probably the most
sacred and most necessary [constitutional right] for the very dignity of humans’.158
More specifically, if one looks at privacy from an English-Hellenic comparative
perspective, one may associate the existence of a ‘Bill of Rights’ with endorsement
of the protective principle. Whilst a right to privacy has featured in all Hellenic
Constitutions during the last two centuries, ‘in English law there [was] no right to
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privacy’ until recently.159 This may explain why there is so much emphasis on
privacy violations in Greece and why automatic exclusion has become the
favoured remedy, whereas privacy violations rank only as one factor among others
in the context of discretionary exclusion in England and Wales.
Bitter, and not-too-distant, experience of rule by military junta in Greece is
another factor influencing a robust approach towards violations of civil liberties,
and the right to privacy in particular. Mirjan Damaška’s general observation finds
ample confirmation in the case of Greece:
In the aftermath of the traumatic totalitarian experience, the sensi-
tivity to values such as human dignity, or privacy, has impelled most
continental jurisdictions to accept the idea that probative material
should be rejected when obtained in violation of certain human
rights.160
Automatic exclusion for violations of the right to privacy must also be seen in the
context of the procedural framework within which this doctrine was developed in
Greece. Hellenic criminal procedure is ‘applied constitutional law’,161 demanding
that the protection of constitutional rights within the criminal process takes
priority over countervailing public interests.162 In other words, criminal law
doctrines develop within a culture of constitutional rights, and probably as a
result of it. The development of automatic evidentiary exclusion in Greece, culmi-
nating in a constitutional exclusionary rule for violations of the right to privacy, is
one manifestation of this phenomenon. This development occurred despite
criminal law scholarship strongly advocating a balancing approach.
The basis in the Constitution of both automatic exclusion and the protective
principle approach in Greece should be of particular significance for England and
Wales, given the ‘looming constitutionalization of English criminal procedure
law’163 under the European Convention umbrella. Regardless of its short-term
impact,164 the European Convention on Human Rights will probably strengthen
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the incipient quasi-constitutional procedural culture in England in the long run,
eventually producing a more hospitable jurisprudential climate for the protective
principle, if not the adoption of automatic exclusion.165 This would be all the more
likely if the European Court were to abandon its current position and embrace the
view that admitting evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy conflicts
with the right to a fair trial.166
At the same time it must be acknowledged that the Hellenic example also lends
support to more sceptical views. Critics of the protective principle might point to
the risk that inflexible exclusionary rules lead courts to interpret the Constitution
too narrowly or pay only lip-service to evidentiary provisions. Critics might also
stress that Greece abandoned the rights-centred approach in the context of serious
criminality (anyway limited to evidence obtained by the commission of criminal
offences) and that the Hellenic exclusionary rules focus exclusively on surrepti-
tiously recorded private conversations. The admissibility of other tangible
evidence, even in the context of privacy violations—e.g. improperly obtained DNA
evidence or real evidence obtained by unauthorised police searches—has very
rarely troubled the courts in the past. In addition, it is nearly always the ‘civil
party’ rather than the prosecution that submits the contested evidence. Prose-
cution authorities are perhaps unwilling to risk compromising their surveillance
methods or the identities of their sources by adducing covertly-recorded conversa-
tions at a public trial, considering that intercepted communications can still
be useful intelligence leading towards alternative sources of evidence.167 Critics
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would therefore be right to insist that the Hellenic exclusionary model has its
limitations with regard to constitutional rights protection.
The more fundamental objection that Continental criminal procedure presents
only an ‘exclusionary illusion’, as a result of the fact-finder’s access to ‘excluded’
evidence, has already been exposed as an exaggeration.168 More generally, the
sceptic might contend that the significance of evidentiary exclusion is muted in
Continental jurisdictions, where the fact-finder has access to more information
than is typically the case in common law trials, including hearsay and bad
character evidence,169 and scrupulously examines the defendant and other
witnesses in court.170 The Continental fact-finder works on the basis of an ‘investi-
gation dossier’ providing him with the fruits of an extensive pre-trial ‘official
inquiry’ conducted by a powerful ‘investigating judge’. In his single-minded
pursuit of truth the Continental fact-finder can count on the assistance not only of
a powerful prosecutor, but also of a ‘civil party’ determined to assist in the
conviction of the defendant. In this light, the sceptic might conclude that in
a Continental setting the fact-finder has sufficient means to pursue the truth
even when important incriminating evidence has been excluded. This might
explain the progressive approach to evidentiary exclusion encountered in some
Continental systems.
In response it should be emphasised that the scope for exclusion is much wider in
Greece than in Anglo-American legal systems, and the impact on truth-finding is
therefore potentially much more significant. The absence of ‘alternative’ proce-
dures in Greece—most notably bargained guilty pleas—results in many more trials
where exclusionary rules apply.171 It cannot therefore be said that exclusionary
rules in Greece impose no costs in terms of convictions being quashed. Greece
has adopted mandatory exclusionary rules in spite of their potentially consid-
erable ‘exclusionary toll’, and against the background of a Continental criminal
procedure committed to the principle of free proof and traditionally hostile
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towards evidentiary barriers to conviction.172 Viewed from this angle, Greece’s
endorsement of a stringent exclusionary approach to improperly obtained
evidence reflects a conscious political choice.
Greece made this choice under the influence of a culture of constitutional rights
and despite countervailing practical considerations. For example, close judicial
supervision of criminal investigations in Greece173 reduces the need for ex post facto
vindication of defendants’ rights through exclusionary rules. Judicial supervision
can provide defendants, in theory at least, with sufficient protection ex ante. In
addition, the existence of a centralised police force under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Public Order means there is no need for exclusionary rules to lead,
through relevant case law, to standardisation of police practices.174 Such practices
are more or less taken for granted in Continental countries like Greece, where the
police force is bureaucratically organised and its activities are governed by a Code of
Penal Procedure.
6. Conclusions
Considering that ‘modern law’s cosmopolitan tendencies [can open] up new vistas
of possibility for Evidence teaching and scholarship’,175 attention to Hellenic law
might be enriching in many ways for the debate on improperly obtained evidence
in Anglo-American legal systems. First of all, it reveals that the exclusionary rule is
not idiomatic to Anglo-American law.176 In particular, Greece possesses significant
automatic exclusionary rules, which can also be found in other Continental
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jurisdictions.177 This article also equips common law scholars with a detailed illus-
tration of a legal system where the protective principle has been explicitly
endorsed and implemented in practice. Hellenic law demonstrates that a
rights-centred approach to improperly obtained evidence may be a realistic option
for some countries. In the case of Greece, it was a realistic option for a country
with a strongly liberal Constitution and a rights-centred approach to criminal
process values.
Analogies with Greece must be taken for what they are worth, however, especially
in terms of legal reform. After all, ‘[t]he decision to endorse a particular approach
to the exclusionary rule […] is partly a political choice’.178 Independently of
whether the law develops under the influence of a liberal Constitution—be that in
a common law or Continental law procedural setting—adopting a particular
approach to the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence will always come
down to a difficult balance between the protection of rights and the efficient
investigation of crime. In that respect, Greece offers the interesting example of a
country which has taken the unreserved political decision that constitutional
rights come first.
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